The complicated and uncertain value of elite tight end prospects

We can safely assume that Brock Bowers will be drafted too early. But where should teams consider taking an elite tight end prospect in the NFL draft?

Brock Bowers is projected to go somewhere in the 10-15 overall range in the 2014 NFL draft. AP

Like most long-term trends in the NFL, when to draft elite tight ends has been moving in the direction of analytics insights, i.e. definitely not early. Sure, we have Kyle Pitts going fourth overall three years back, and T.J. Hockenson the eighth overall pick a couple years before that, but generally the trend has been to be more skeptical of elite tight end prospects. Just because a handful of NFL teams were willing to take Ezekiel Elliott, Leonard Fournette, and Saquon Barkley in the top-4 doesn’t mean the larger trend isn’t still to fade running backs in the draft. From 2000-2010, 16 tight ends were selected in the first round of NFL drafts, a number that dropped to 10 over the next 13 drafts.

In order for analytical insights to bring the gap to NFL reality, there has to be highly visible, recent evidence to combine with the data-based long-term trends. Analytical practitioners inside and outside of the NFL had been pushing the go-for-it agenda on fourth downs for years, but it took the Eagles 2017 Super Bowl run to pour gas on the first and accelerate the trend of increasing aggressiveness across the NFL. Everyone was talking about the numbers behind why teams should go for it more often when Bill Belichick shocked the world and did so on 4th & 2 on his own side of the field, but that didn’t change hearts and minds on the subject until it was combined with the success of the Eagles.

The succession of running back busts, like C.J. Spiller and Trent Richardson, combined with several second-contract debacles for successful picks like Todd Gurley and Ezekiel Elliott provided the tangible evidence to the analytical numbers on their lower value. In a similar way, the lack of success among recent first-round tight ends should combine with the analytical evidence to further shift out when they are taken.

The stark failures for tight ends in recent years was best summarized in short-form by the Ringer’s Sheil Kapadia.

Without this poor track record, and the questionable career beginnings of the last “generational” tight end in Kyle Pitts (each NFL generation lasts around two human years), this year’s mold-breaking top prospect Brock Bowers would probably be in consideration as a top-5 pick, instead of projected to go in the 10-16 range according to ESPN’s soothsayer Adam Schefter. In fact, I think there’s a good chance that Bowers falls out of that range if the Jets - his assumed most like suitor - pass at 10th overall. I don’t get mock drafters’ thoughts that the Chargers would burn the fifth overall pick on Bowers, as much as I don’t think trade-back king Chris Ballard will risk blowing value on a tight end at 15. The Bengals are the next likely suitor according to the results of my Consensus Mock Draft 2.0, and Bowers could tumble into the 20s without their selection.

The analytical underpinning for not taking a tight end prospect in the first half of the first round is comprised to two main components:

• Top tight ends make a lot less money on their NFL contracts, therefore the surplus value gained on low-cost rookie contracts pales in comparison to other positions.

• Historically it’s been relatively difficult to evaluate and rank order tight end prospects, lessening the assumed value of those taken earlier.

My personal take is that there’s been too much focus on the first and not enough on the second. It’s true that the top-5 tight ends have an average 2024 cap hit of $15.3 million versus the equivalent number for wide receivers at $28.5 million, or 86% higher. But I don’t think a simply framing of losing that massive surplus value is correct. There are so few truly difference-making tight ends in the NFL that looking at the top-5 2024 cap hits includes names like Darren Waller and Tyler Higbee.

The top-5 cap hits at tight end this season don’t include George Kittle, reflecting another inherent feature of tight end contracts: the true difference makers don’t earn what they deserve, primarily due to the ceiling effect of the franchise tag. Tight ends coming to the end of their rookie contracts are faced with taking lower extensions, or risk injury and have to play out the franchise tag system which pays tight ends only $12.6 million in 2024.

That number is based on the top-5 players at the position, and there are never top-5 true difference-making tight ends in the NFL at the same time. It becomes a vicious feedback loop that lowers contracts for elite tight ends, and those contracts are then used as benchmarks for the next group of elite players at the position. The contract stuff is too much of a focus because the problem for NFL teams in missing out on theoretical surplus value goes away if you hit on the next Kittle, Travis Kelce, Mark Andrews or Rob Gronkowski. Those guys provided a ton of surplus value on rookie deals over calculated numbers based on a larger swath of players. They also provide more value on second contracts than other positions that demand higher jumps into record breaking deals with the expanding salary cap.

The fact that I can only name four tight ends drafted since 2010 in the group of rock-solid elite tight ends shows the real problem with taking one early: Getting outsized upside value on any pick is exceedingly rare. There have been good players at the position over the last 15 years outside of the truly elite options, like Zach Ertz and Greg Olsen, and Jimmy Graham did have a handful of outstanding receiving seasons that rivaled anything we’ve ever seen at the position. But if drafting an Ertz, Olsen or Graham the type of upside career outcome NFL teams are hoping for when using an early first-round pick? I don’t think so.

In addition, only Olsen among the admittedly small sample of tight ends listed was even first round picks (31st overall). Finding an elite tight end is like searching for a needle in a haystack, and the first-round haystack hasn’t been any easier of a search.

Looking first at the active first-round tight ends who are young enough to still make big impacts in the NFL.

There’s some promise with the rookie season for Kyle Pitts and T.J. Hockenson played well enough to get a top second contract and solid trade compensation for the team that drafted him. Dalton Kincaid is still an unknown, but I think we can close the book on the rest for being elite options. David Njoku has improved over several years as a younger player entering the NFL at a slower developing position, but I don’t think the value he’s generated for the Browns compares to a wide receiver at the end of the first round.

Going back further to first-round tight ends drafted since 2000, the picture doesn’t get a lot better.

The Lions taking Eric Ebron over Odell Beckham Jr. in the 2014 NFL draft is stuff of legend (somewhat mitigated by Beckham’s decline), and the 18 tight ends selected in the first round during this period only produced a combined five All-Pro selections (two First-Team and three Second-Team).

Their results are what feeds into surplus value calculations like the one I produced for probably my most popular piece.

The surplus value calculation for tight ends looks awful overall, especially through the first first round, due to underwhelming historical results. Tight ends only sit above safeties in surplus value produced at the top of drafts, but they sustain value much better moving from the second-to-third round and beyond.

As much as I believe in the numbers driving our process, we also need to recognize the inherent unknowns looking only backwards at the range of outcomes, especially for a small sample of draft picks at the tight end position.

The play-style gets further and further from the current day when we go back to before the 2000 NFL draft to look at career outcomes, but it can still be useful to see how those first-round tight ends performed. Looking at the 34 tight ends taken in the first round as far back as my data goes (1960), we see a lot more success at the position.